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What this little book tells you
This Little Book is about philosophy. In our research on the PETRAS project, 
many of the researchers have drawn on different philosophical theories 
to help them to understand some of the difficult relationships between the 
digital, physical and connectivity qualities of the Internet of Things (IoT).1 
In our research, we have had to consider these relationships in terms of 
how they impact privacy, ethics, trust, risk, security, and adoption. So, 
throughout this book, we present several different philosophical theories 








Because philosophy is so broad and many of its ideas have been around 
for thousands of years, it can be hard to know how it might apply to some-
thing as contemporary and technologically focused as the IoT, or to figure 
out how to get started with that challenge. With this difficulty in mind, 
the seven chapters in this book each describe how you can use different 
aspects of philosophy and theory to think about and understand the IoT. 
We have written this book in plain English - each of the chapters can be 
read on their own as a stand-alone, but if you read the whole book, then 
the links between some of the theories and examples will start to become 
more clearly visible.
4
1 See the first book in this series, The Little Book of Design Fiction for the Internet of Things, for our 










Philosophy is a vast area of study addressing fundamental questions of 
reality, knowledge, and existence. To demonstrate how huge the ideas of 
philosophy can be, consider these three quotes from some famous think-
ers:
• “I think, therefore I am” (René Descartes)
• “One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a 
dancing star” (Friedrich “The unexamined life is not worth living” 
(Socrates).
Exploring and attempting to answer fundamental questions about the 
world, philosophy is a key part of all academic research as it provides us 
with theories to help and guide us in thinking about the world.  
The Internet of Things challenges many of our common-sense notions of 
how the world works, which is why the PETRAS IoT research hub is con-
cerned with cross-cutting themes that include privacy, ethics, and trust, 
security and adoption. When everyday objects are connected to the In-
ternet or have computing power built into them, our relationships with 
them can become a lot more complicated. Let’s begin by considering the 
following examples: smart kettles don’t just boil water to make tea, they 
can also tell the corporation that built the kettle about your daily routine 
and how many times you boil the kettle to have a cup of tea — what does 
this mean for your privacy? Although you have to buy them, many IoT 
devices only function correctly if they can connect to server-farms located 
somewhere else in the world — what does this mean for ownership? And, if 
your home thermostat can make decisions about when your heating comes 
on without asking you first, why doesn’t it have to worry about paying 
your energy bill? Using philosophy and theory is one way we can begin 
to answer these questions.  
If you are a philosopher, then this book should provide some interesting 
5
• “I think, therefore I am” (René Descartes).
• “One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a 
da cing ar” (Friedrich Nietzsch ).
• “The unexamined life is not worth living” (Socrates).
examples of how theory is being used to inform research into the IoT. If 
you are an IoT researcher or professional technologist, then this book will 
show you how useful philosophy can be in helping you to understand in-
ternet connected devices in a deeper way. If you are simply curious, then 
we hope that the book will stimulate the curiosity that made you pick it up 
in the first place!
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Thingyness
Described by combining the Greek words for to exist (Onto) and to study 
(Logia), ontology is the branch of philosophy that tries to understand what 
the fundamental parts of the world are, how they are related to each other, 
and how we know what is real. Although we intuitively feel like we know 
what is real and what is not real, as ontologists have explained, philosoph-
ically speaking, things are not as simple as they seem. For example, are 
conceptual objects like love, hate or war, any more or less real than very 
physical things like stones, roses and guns? By asking and attempting to 
answer questions like this, ontologists have developed theories that we 
use to explain what it means to be. Because this book is about the Internet 
of Things, in this section we look at how ontology might be applied to the 
question of what it is like to be a thing? 
There are many different perspectives in ontology.2 Materialists believe 
that the only real things in the world are physical; they say that it is only 
matter (wood, rock, concrete, water, etc) that really exists.  In contrast, 
idealists believe that it is human thought that is not only real, but more im-
portant than matter; only through thought do we construct reality. Realists 
argue that all human experience of the world is mediated by our physical 
selves and our mental conceptual framework, both of which are necessary 
for conscious experience; and, whether or not the ultimate reality is phys-
ical or mental, or both, there is a real world that exists independently of 
human experience. Correlationism is the view that our experiences reflect 
or correlate with the real world; it is the idea that we humans experi-
ence the world via a combination of what exists in our minds and what 
our bodies can experience in the physical world. The speculative real-
ists challenge the validity of correlationism; they speculate that instead 
of our experiences being a correlation between the imagined and the 
7
2 See here for more information on Ontology: Hofweber, T. 2018. “Logic and Ontology” Stan-
ford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-on-
tology/.
physical, that perhaps every individual thing, idea, or concept, might have 
its own reality, not necessarily resembling, reflecting, or correlating with 
our experiences. Speculative realism asks, “why would you — a human 
being — be able to shed light on the reality of a teapot?” Because it chal-
lenges firmly held ideas, speculative realism is quite bold and very weird, 
but by giving an alternative to these old ideas, it is also quite exciting. 
One reason for the current developing interest in this perspective is that 
rapid changes in science, such as quantum physics, and technological 
revolutions such as the IoT, are shaking the foundations of our knowledge.
8
Figure 1. The clamshell of speculative realism (Shelfish Philosopher, 2018).
“..speculative realism is an event rather than a philosophical posi-
tion: it names a moment when the epistemological tide ebbed, re-
vealing the iridescent shells of realism they had so long occluded” 
(Bogost, 2012) 
Building from the speculative realist school of thought, Object Oriented 
Ontology (OOO) is a theory for addressing the question what it is like to 
   
 
   
 
 
be a  thing? OOO tries to know the unknowable and to get inside the 
reality of any given object (although it also acknowledges that this is al-
most entirely impossible). The strange world of OOO is interesting as a 
thought experiment, but how do we know we can trust it? Ian Bogost,3 
makes the point that “one ought not trust a metaphysician4 who had only 
read and written books about the nature of the universe’. He is arguing 
that we should only really trust philosophers if we can see they have real 
experience of doing the philosophy they talk about in books. To explain 
this further, Bogost introduces an idea called carpentry as a practical way 
to do OOO by writing computer code or building things that help us to 
better understand the inner world of objects. By using carpentry, we can 
use OOO to understand, critique, and help to design better IoT devices.5
The first thing to remember with OOO is that any thing is an object. For 
example, you are an object, your eyes, brain, hair, and sense of humour 
are all objects too. This book is also an object, so are the words on the 
page, and so is your experience of reading it. The IoT is an object. And 
the things that are part of the IoT are objects too—from internet-connected 
toys, to autonomous cars, to the behind-the-scenes data-centres that make 
a lot of IoT devices work properly. OOO tells us that none of these objects 
in themselves are more meaningful or significant than any other. Because 
every object is defined by its own unique, exclusive, and particular reality, 
we cannot say that any particular thing is intrinsically more important than 
another. So, as opposed to idealism and correlationism (which privileges 
humans over other types of object) and in contrast to materialism (that 
promotes the human interpretation of other objects), the object-oriented 
view sees the universe in terms of a non-hierarchical, or flat, ontology. The 
flat ontology is essential because even if two different objects — let’s say a
3 Ian Bogost is an author, game designer, and scholar. His book Alien Phenomenology, or What 
it’s Like to be a Thing (2012) introduces his interpretation of Speculative Realism and Object 
Oriented Ontology. 
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4 A metaphysician is a philosopher who studies the fundamental nature of reality and existence 
itself.
5 Lindley, J., Coulton, P. and Akmal, H. 2018. “Turning philosophy with a speculative lathe: 
Object oriented ontology, carpentry and design fiction.” Proceedings of the Design Research 
Society Conference 2018, Limerick, Ireland, 24th-25th June. Available at: http://eprints.lancs.
ac.uk/124284/.
television and the stand it sits upon — are physically close to one anoth-
er, they do not necessarily have much ontologically in common, and just 
because they don’t have much in common, it doesn’t mean one is more 
significant than the other.
There are many kinds of IoT-things — from toothbrushes to aeroplanes and 
lampposts to heart implants. They also live double lives; their physical ex-
istence is visible, tangible, and every day (a smart fridge is still very much 
a fridge!), but they also have a digital life that is entirely foreign to us 
humans. In the blink of a human eye, IoT devices sense our world, convert 
what they discover into data, and send that data to the other side of the 
planet where it is stored in a factory-sized data centre. They also serve 
multiple different purposes at the same time, but for different people. For 
example, for householders who have smart meters installed, smart meters 
are primarily a convenience as you no longer have to allow meter-read-
ers to enter your house. But for energy companies, they could mean cost 
savings, because they don’t have to pay human meter-readers any more. 
At the same time, for power stations, smart meters might allow a better 
understanding of fluctuations in energy demand. It is because of the di-
versity of IoT-things, their physical/digital double lives, and their multiple 
possible meanings, that OOO is so useful for helping to understand the IoT 
in its entirety. So, through OOO, philosophy provides ways for businesses, 
researchers, designers and governments to understand thingyness so that 
they can drive forward adoption of the IoT and harness its economic value 
in socially and technically acceptable ways.6
   
 








Figure 2. Read out of a message sent by an IoT device used as part of an OOO 
Carpentry project. 
6 Lindley, J., Coulton, P., and Cooper, R. (2017). Why the Internet of Things needs Object Orien-
tated Ontology. The Design Journal, 20(sup 1), S2846-S2857.
Hyperobjects
Timothy Morton defines a Hyperobject as a thing that is, “massively distrib-
uted in time and space relative to humans.”7 In other words, something so 
temporally and spatially vast that it defies common-sense understandings of 
it. Morton’s primary example is climate change. Climate change is a thing. 
It has its own ontological and empirically verifiable existence. This is a little 
strange, because, unlike other things — pencils, your favourite shoes, or your 
neighbour’s cat — climate change cannot be apprehended in the same way. 
You can’t see it or touch it. One can demonstrate, through experimentation, 
statistics and observation that the Earth’s climate has got warmer (and is 
getting warmer), and that this is the consequence of human action. You may 
experience a flood, for example, a storm, or an unseasonably hot day. All 
of these things are aspects of the hyperobject that we call climate change, 
but they are not the thing itself, only its symptoms. Climate change, as an 
object, is too big, its effects too large, its essence too temporally and spa-
tially spread out to be perceived as a thing in the traditional sense. In fact, 
if you start thinking about climate change in these terms, it challenges our 
conception of what a thing even is. 
When you grasp the idea of the hyperobject, you realise that we’re actually 
surrounded by, within, and are part of many of them. Our use of oil, the 
creation of nuclear waste, and polystyrene packaging are three examples. 
Polystyrene is something we usually experience for a few fleeting moments 
when we open up a new product, but the polystyrene itself may then go on 
to have another life — in a landfill site, part of the mid-Pacific rubbish island, 
enter the digestive system of a sea turtle, and be returned to the Earth as 
part of a new geological stratum in thousands of years’ time. Something as 
simple as a polystyrene coffee cup, that we might presume to be quite sim-
ple and easily definable, when seen as a hyperobject, becomes something 
different; the coffee cup has time travelling superpowers.  
11
7 Morton, Timothy. 2013. Hyperobjects : philosophy and ecology after the end of the world. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Qualities such as being able to exist for thousands of years demonstrate 
one of the defining qualities of hyperobjects; we don’t intuitively have ways 
to manage our relationships with them. It is true that there is a direct con-
nection between your morning coffee and the entry of microplastic into the 
food chain. Similarly, your decision about whether to go on holiday in Aus-
tralia or Cornwall, depending on where you live, of course, relates to the 
increasing incidence of storms in the Caribbean. However, as we discover 
by considering these hyperobjects, it is very hard to connect your immediate 
sphere of action, for example, this cup of coffee, or that flight to Oz, with 
your interaction with the hyperobject (let alone what that hyperobject may 
come to represent in the future). 
The IoT is a hyperobject. Just as with global warming, it’s very difficult for 
an individual to fully understand their relationship with the IoT. When you 
use IoT devices like your Amazon Echo or use your smart TV, it may feel 
like you’re simply interacting with a normal thing, but there’s actually a 
lot more going on. Although the Amazon Echo is a product you buy and 
own in order to accomplish a specific task: there’s a lot more to it than that. 
When you interact with Alexa, you’re actually interacting with a multiplicity 
of servers, algorithms, software and data economies. These might include 
the device itself, Amazon’s voice recognition technologies, the infrastructure 
of your smart lighting provider, the telephone cables to your house, and 
Amazon employees in Alaska. Some parts of these systems are located in 
your home or near your house, while others are literally on the other side 
of the world; some you own but some are the property of others; some are 
software, some hardware, and some human.  
In the case of the Echo, Amazon use data collected from your use of their 
device in order to improve the service they deliver. They also use this data 
to target products at you. Those products are designed by people, manu-
factured in factories, and transported in ships, wagons, vans, and planes. 
The hyperobject that is the IoT spans the globe, it connects countries, and it 
transcends the digital and the physical. When they are IoT-enabled, turning 
on the lights is no longer just about turning on the lights. As Cambridge 
Analytica’s involvement in influencing the US Presidential election and the 
UK’s Brexit referendum demonstrated, individuals’ use of services, such as 
Facebook, is something that only those individuals can consent to — and 
that is their right. However, as societies, perhaps we should consider hy-
12
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perobjects a little more, and use them to think through the implications of 
apparently simple actions. Hyperobjects is a useful concept when thinking 
about how to work out what it means to live surrounded by the IoT, and can 
help us to decide how enthusiastic, cautious, or careful we want to be when 
considering the adoption of the IoT (and in particular how fair or acceptable 
it seems to us). 
Morton ends with a warning and argues that in the face of hyperobjects, 
humans are entering a time of ‘hypocrisy, weakness, and lameness’. We 
drink our morning coffee; the cup is the cause of death of a whale 10 years 
from now. We fill up our car at the petrol station; a coastal village in the 
Maldives is flooded next summer. The cat gifs we liked on Facebook turn out 
to contribute to the dissolution of democracy, as we know it. We tell Alexa 
to turn the lights down; what traces have we left in the hyperobject that is 
the Internet of Things, and how might they be used in future? 
Heterotopias
Have you ever walked into a room and thought, “this is a big space”, or 
perhaps gestured to your friend in a movie theatre as if to say, “there’s 
a space over here, come join me”? On a crowded train most of us have 
thought, “Can I just have some space, please”? Although we use the con-
cept intuitively in our everyday lives, defining what space is has caused 
philosophers to scratch their heads for centuries. There are clear differences 
between the space that a room occupies, the space a building defines, the 
personal spaces which we imagine around our bodies, or the unimaginably 
huge outer space that — despite being full of stars — is mostly empty.
Yi-Fu Tuan, a key figure in the Human Geography movement, characterised 
space as a way of communicating different ideas:8 
People of different cultures differ in how they divide up their world, assign 
values to its parts, and measure them […] Man, out of his intimate experi-
ence with his body and with other people, organizes space so that it con-
forms with and caters to his biological needs and social relations.
So, spaces, like our bodies, the houses, our towns, cities, and the whole 
universe, are the locations of a huge variety of intimate experiences. How-
ever, the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, says that, beyond the famil-
iar and intimate spaces that Tuan talks about, there are other spaces9 we 
interact with all the time but aren’t necessarily aware of, and these have 
different properties. For example, the space that your image is in when 
you look into a mirror — what is the nature of that space? Or the voice 
at the other end of a phone call — what space does the voice occupy? 
14
8 Tuan, Y.-F. 1979. “Space and place: humanist perspective.” In Philosophy in Geography, 
edited by S. Gale and G. Olson. Springer Netherlands.
9 See his essay on this written in 1967 called “Des espaces autres (Of other spaces: utopias 
and heterotopias).”  Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité, 1984, Translated from the French 
by Jay Miskowiec 16 (1):22-27.
So, spaces, like our bodies, the houses, our towns, cities, and the whole 
universe, are the locations of a huge variety of intimate experiences. How-
ever, the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, says that, beyond the famil-
iar and intimate spaces that Tuan talks about, there are other spaces9 we 
interact with all the time but aren’t necessarily aware of, and these have 
different properties. For example, the space that your image is in when 
you look into a mirror — what is the nature of that space? Or the voice
People of different cultures differ in how they divide up their world, 
assign values to its parts, and measure them […] Man, out of his 
intimate experience with his body and with other people, organizes 
space so that it conforms with and caters to his biological needs and 
social relations.
Tuan (1979)8
To describe and explore these strange spaces Foucault came up with the 
term Heterotopia (which literally means ‘other place’ in Greek); he also 
developed a series of principles that explained how heterotopias function.
Heterotopias are spaces within spaces that relate to each other. The 
space of the mirror image exists because there is something in the space 
in front of the mirror and the space occupied by the voice-on-the-phone 
exists because, somewhere, a person speaks into a telephone hand-
set. In both examples, neither space can exist without the other, but they 
don’t always play nicely together. These interlinked spaces have their 
unique sets of rules and properties, and Foucault asked lots of questions 
to try and understand what these are. For example, what is allowed to 
be experienced in a space and in what order, what circumstances dictate 
these experiences, and, most importantly, who gets to decide on all this? 
For example, let’s imagine a museum. When you step inside there are rules 
that you must abide by; sometimes no photographs, only quiet talking, no 
touching of the exhibits, and absolutely no trampolining. The museum allows 
you access to one sort of space, but the museum heterotopia also denies 
you access to another sort. Museum heterotopias don’t just manipulate
15
Figure 3. The spaces inside mirrors and phone calls, are a way to imagine Hetero-
topias or other spaces
   
 
   
 
 
at the oth r end of a phone call — what space does the voice occupy?
To describe and explore these strange spaces Foucault came up with the 
term Heterotopia (which literally means ‘other place’ in Greek); he also 
developed a series of principles that explained how heterotopias function.
Heterotopias are spaces within space  that relate to each other. Th
space of the mirro  im ge exist  because th re is something i   spac
in front of the mirror and the space occu ied by the voic -on-th -p o e 
exists because, somewh re, a erson sp aks into a tel phone hands t.
In both exam les, either space can xist without the other, but y
don’t always play nicely t g th r. These interlinked spaces hav  heir
unique sets of rules and properti s, and Foucault asked lots of questions
to try and un erst nd what these are. For example, what is allowed o
be experi nced in  space and in wha  order, what circumstances dictate
these experiences, and, most importantly, who gets to decide on all this? 
For example, let’s imagine a mus um. W en you step i side there are rules
hat you must abide by; sometimes no photographs, only quiet talking, no
t ching of the exhibi s, and absol tely no tra polining. The museum al-
lows you access to one sort of space, but the museum heterotopia lso de-
nies you access to another sort. Museum heterotopias don’t just manipulate
space, but, in a sense, they twist time too. By providing a physical space for 
artefacts from the past, they create temporal illusions and transport the ar-
tefacts of the past into the audiences of the present. The timeless trinkets we 
see in museums create heterotopic rules that break up our understandings 
of space; although museums are public places, they allow for very private 
interactions between you, the artefacts, and other visitors in the space.  
The IoT has created a whole range of new heterotopias. For example, let’s 
consider the smartphone. The text conversations you have, phone calls you 
make, and emails you send using a smartphone appear, at first glance, to 
fit with commonly held conceptions of private spaces. However, if we con-
sider that any message on your phone can be shared with anyone else 
through a screenshot — the nature of this ‘private’ space changes. Further, 
if we consider that your email app vendor knows not only the content of 
your email, but where you are when you’re reading your messages, and 
where you go after reading them — a new, anti-private dimension is re-
vealed. We might also think about the apps and platforms that smartphones 
provide access to. Although smartphones hold and protect our most pri-
vate conversations and content, they are also the gateways to sharing 
it in the most public of ways. They create heterotopias that exhibit very 
complex relationships with our conceptions of public and private spaces.
Whilst it may be true that you can close doors and windows to make yourself 
more private at home, similar safeguards are less obvious when objects exist 
in the digital and physical world. The inter-connectivity of the IoT supercharg-
es this effect. Something as apparently simple as a fitness tracking watch can 
quickly transcend the apparently public number of steps you take on your walk 
to work and segue into the very private world of your health: although your 
boots were made for walking, were they made for walking all over the Internet?
These interactions between you, your devices, and the internet are illustrated 
in this diagram. There are things (both private and public) in the real-spaces 
we occupy, such as walking to the park, thinking in our head, or writing in 
a diary. Similarly, there are digital counterparts to all of these things in a 
digital space. The overlaps are where the heterotopias occur and each one 
functions in a different way with unique rules. Consider the fitness tracker: 
it’s counting your physical steps, saving them as data locally, sharing that 
data to different places online, and all the while seeing other devices like 
16
itself around it. That’s a lot of possible interactions! The deeper we go into 
the diagram the more complex these interactions become. What’s in the mid-
dle you ask? By applying Foucault’s thinking we can begin to figure that out. 
Looking at smart devices, such as a fitness tracker, in this way, reveals par-
ticular forms of heterotopias, which then help us to understand their com-
plexity, and give us a better appreciation of understanding of the fluidity of 
notions such as public and private when the physical and virtual combine. 
Using heterotopias in this way is a useful tool for designers, developers, and 





Figure 4. Did you know your fitness tracker was so active? 
   
 




The proliferation of “smart” things that make life easier, more comfortable, 
and more efficient is central to the vision of IoT in the home. What differenti-
ates these IoT devices from the less “smart” things of the past is their level of 
automation. Through embedded computation, connectivity and data-driven 
software “smart” devices have more complex behaviours.  
As automation increases, and given that IoT devices can carry out actions for 
themselves or on somebody’s behalf, questions arise relating to how such 
devices should act. For instance, when a smart meter suggests ways to save 
money, should it include options for switching energy provider? Intuitively 
the answer seems to be yes; so long as it behaved lawfully, a smart meter 
acting as a dutiful assistant seems an acceptable proposition. However, if 
we consider the smart meters that are deployed in the UK they include fea-
tures such as directly reporting usage for more accurate billing, the ability to 
remotely control (and shut off) supplies when “necessary”, and the ability to 
detect and disclose how energy is used throughout the home. Some of this 
functionality could easily be seen by customers as privacy-invading, in some 
cases even hostile, and in many cases something that many would prefer to 
do without.  
As things become “smarter”, they necessarily end up taking actions and 
making choices that reflect the needs of their users. In the case of smart 
meters, the users are both the individuals whose houses the meters are in-
stalled in, and the energy companies that design and deploy them. Here we 
consider how these differing needs may be interpreted in terms of respect.  
Borrowing concepts from economic theory and moral philosophy can help 
us to understand what it means to create respectful IoT devices. The smart 
meter example illustrates a kind of moral hazard commonly discussed in 
political science and economics, known as the principal-agent problem 
or agency dilemma. Such an agency dilemma occurs whenever someone, 
known as the agent, is asked or expected to take actions on behalf of some-
one else, known as the principal; in these situations, the agent may be 
18
motivated to act in its own best interests, rather than those of the principal’s. 
How do we decide if the agent’s preferences are more or less important 
than the principal’s? Immanuel Kant, a significant contributor to moral phi-
losophy, argued as part of what he called the Categorical Imperative, that 
an essential aspect of behaving morally is treating others with respect. Being 
respectful, in Kant’s eyes, requires treating principal’s as ends in themselves, 
rather than a means to further the aims of the agent. This means being 
genuinely concerned about the needs of others, rather than using them in 
a selfish manner.10  Thus, the moral choice, for an agent, is to prioritise the 
principal’s needs over its own. Although core to the Kantian notion of moral-
ity was having respect for a person as a living conscious being, the concept 
of respect is really quite versatile and can help us explore IoT devices and 
automation further.  
The following four types of respect we have found particularly useful in 
understanding and explaining how respectful our relationships with smart 
devices are. When we say moral decisions require respecting a person’s 
needs, we use the term direct respect to mean to observe, consider, and 
to support their needs. Direct respect describes a device’s behaviour as it 
relates to some preferable law or guideline. For example, we might say that 
devices must respect users’ basic human rights; the rights to life, liberty, and 
privacy. This would constrain the device from performing actions that might 
be interpreted as violating these principles, such as committing murder, en-
slavement, or surveillance. Direct respect characterises a behaviour against 
rules, while the remaining types of respect describe how the agent, the IoT 
device, views the principal, the user.
Recognition respect refers to agents that are sensitive to, observe, and rec-
ognise aspects of the principal. For example, imagine a smart device being 
able to automatically recognise a person’s mobility impairment and auto-
matically adjust furniture in response.
Obstacle respect relates to the agent seeing the principal and their needs 
as obstacles to the agent’s own motivations. One interpretation of obstacle 
respect requires being able to make suitable adjustments to resolve these
19
10 Kant, I., Hill, T. and Zweig, A. 2002. Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals, Oxford 
philosophical texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press
obstacles, and thus to serve the principal. However, another interpretation 
suggests the opposite, as it suggests that merely characterising the prin-
cipal’s needs as an obstacle to be overcome means failing to genuinely 
see the principal’s needs as the most important thing. A respectful device 
would avoid framing the needs of end-users as obstacles, and instead would 
change the device’s own priorities. 
Finally, care respect, as its name suggests, means to capture the kind of re-
spect associated with the agent protecting the principal’s well-being, usually 
in terms of long-term goals. For a smart device, having care respect might 
involve the agent refusing to order an unhealthy takeaway when the princi-
pal is trying to lose weight.
Establishing a rich vocabulary for describing the ways that smart things 
might behave towards users in their social, human environments can po-
tentially help people form expectations around them. However, respectful 
human relationships involve complex mixtures of various kinds of respect, 
therefore, devices will need to mimic this and support not just one but many 
such kinds of respect simultaneously. This challenge is among the most im-
portant ones that need to be faced in order to achieve truly pro-social smart 
devices in the home. 
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Fairness
Imagine that the next time you renew your car insurance, you are given the 
option of putting a little computer in the boot of your car which measures 
where and how you drive. If the box decides you are a safe driver, your 
insurance premiums will go down. This is what they call telematic insurance. 
You go for it, and sure enough, after a few months, your monthly premium 
is reduced by £10. Super! 
You recommend telematic insurance to a friend, who agrees to have the 
same little computer in her car. Sure enough, her monthly premium is re-
duced too. She waves her paper bill around in joy. But hang on - she saved 
a whole £25! Insulted and jealous, you wonder: “is she really £15 safer 
than me?”.
You decide to make some enquiries with the insurer. They tell you that their 
algorithm has analysed the times and places you drive, and determined they 
are comparatively riskier than those of your friend. Drivers in the neighbour-
hoods you go to, and the times you go to them, are stopped more often 
by police, and cars are more often broken into. Astonished, you wonder 
“Is that fair?” Of course, on the one hand you understand the argument; 
why, after all, should your friend have to pay as much as you when she 
avoids the riskier parts of town that you frequent? But on the other hand, 
a suspicion makes its way: perhaps the data reflect unjust biases or social 
inequality. What if it turns out that the people driving in the neighbourhoods 
you drive through are more likely to be poor, or members of a marginalised 
community? What if the police disproportionately pull over drivers at those 
times in those areas? What of those invisible yet omnipresent social forces 
that arbitrarily shape the way in which events, people, places, are under-
stood as problematic, or deviant? 
When considering whether to use an IoT device, we tend only to consider 
the effects on ourselves and those directly around us. Will it help me, will 
it hurt me or my family, will it invade my privacy or support my autonomy? 
However, because IoT devices have such widespread ramifications affecting 
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option of putting a little computer in the boot of your car which measures 
where and how you drive. If the box decides you are a safe driver, your 
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same little computer in her car. Sure enough, her monthly premium is re-
duced too. She waves her paper bill around in joy. But hang on - she saved 
a whole £25! Insulted and jealous, you wonder: “is she really £15 safer 
than me?”.
You decide to make some enquiries with the insurer. They tell you that their 
algorithm has analysed the times and places you drive, and determined 
they are comparatively riskier than those of your friend. Drivers in the neigh-
bourhoods you go to, and the times you go to them, are stopped more often 
by police, and cars are more often broken into. Astonished, you wonder 
“Is that fair?” Of course, on the one hand you understand the argument; 
why, after all, should your friend have to pay as much as you when she 
avoids the riskier parts of town that you frequent? But on the other hand, 
a suspicion makes its way: perhaps the data reflect unjust biases or social 
inequality. What if it turns out that the people driving in the neighbourhoods 
you drive through are more likely to be poor, or members of a marginalised 
community? What if the police disproportionately pull over drivers at those 
times in those areas? What of those invisible yet omnipresent social forces 
that arbitrarily shape the way in which events, people, places, are under-
stood as problematic, or deviant? 
When considering whether to use an IoT device, we tend only to consider 
the effects on ourselves and those directly around us. Will it help me, will 
it hurt me or my family, will it invade my privacy or support my autonomy? 
However, because IoT devices have such widespread ramifications affecting 
many people, perhaps we should adopt a more ethical approach, and ask 
questions like, whom will it help or hurt, and by how much? Is it arbitrarily 
treating some people less favourably? Considering society as a whole, is 
it likely to cause more harm than good? Moral and political philosophers 
have thought about these questions for millennia, using various different 
terms including: equality; non-discrimination; distributive justice; and fair-
ness. What they all have in common is that they are all about justly resolving 
conflicts between people over the good things people enjoy and the harms 
or burdens they must endure. This could be about everyone getting an equal 
slice of a cake or ensuring that the justice system is not stacked in favour or 
against certain groups. 
If asked to define fairness, we might be tempted to begin with ‘everyone 
gets the same’. But some people might deserve more cake than others be-
cause it’s their birthday, or another person may get a longer time in prison 
as their crimes were particularly heinous. Aristotle said that moral equality 
means things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are 
unalike should be treated unalike in their un-alikeness’.11
So, fairness means that any two people who are alike in certain morally-rel-
evant ways get the same treatment and those who are unalike should be 
given different treatment according to how different they are. This seems 
sensible, if not self-evident. However, in order to apply it, one needs to have 
a measure of likeness, as well as an account of same treatment, neither of 
which is straightforward.
Political philosophers have offered various accounts of when it is morally ac-
ceptable for some people to end up better off than others. Some strict egal-
itarians (egalitarian refers to a believer in equality) might say that everyone 
should pay exactly the same (in the car insurance case, this means everyone 
paying the same premiums regardless of what driving behaviour the little 
computer detects - what is often called ‘solidarity insurance’). In contrast, 
an extreme libertarian might say that so long as both the customer and 
the insurer agree to the terms, and neither has been forced by the state 
into transacting, then any inequalities are tolerable, and indeed fair.12 Of 
course, there are many intermediate positions between these two extremes.
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ity.” Harvard Law Review:537-596.
12 Nozick, Robert. 1975. Anarchy, state, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
reasons.1414
Many agree with some version of ‘luck egalitarianism’; this holds that peo-
ple should not suffer as a result of circumstances outside their control (bad 
luck), but they should bear the cost of foreseeable consequences of freely 
chosen actions.13 For instance, those born with debilitating genetic diseases 
should have special provisions made available so they can live in parity with 
more able-bodied people; but those who wilfully gamble and lose their sav-
ings to the bookmakers do not deserve compensation. Some critics of luck 
egalitarianism argue it doesn’t go far enough; sometimes, even inequalities 
arising due to an individual’s free choice should be minimised. For instance, 
feminist political philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson, have argued that 
someone who freely chooses to turn down a lucrative career in order to 
care for a loved one may deserve greater consideration than someone else 
who turned down a similar career for other, more selfish, r s s. 
Let’s return to our original example of the telematics computer boxes watch-
ing you and your friend drive; they have clearly observed some differences 
between the two of you and charged different premiums accordingly. Your 
driving habits are similar to those of other drivers who have been stopped 
by police, and your car is often in high-crime places. But is this ‘un-alikeness’ 
a justifiable reason for giving you more expensive insurance? A luck egali-
tarian might ask whether your higher premiums are the result of free choice 
or circumstances outside your control. Are you and your friend equally free 
to choose between driving in low or high-crime areas at low or high-risk 
times? Or does the data collected by telematics reflect unjust social circum-
stances? 
Ultimately, there are some circumstances when telematics-derived insurance 
premiums might be unfair. In theory, everyone with a car has the choice of 
where to drive it, but in practice most people drive at particular times and 
places, out of necessity, between work and home — not entirely the result 
of free choice. If you were born, raised, and live in a high-crime neighbour-
hood, telematic insurance premiums are going to be a stronger reflection of 
unchosen circumstances rather than risks that you have personally
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ies 56 (1):77-93.
14 Anderson, E. S. 1999. “What is the point of equality?” Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
chosen to incur. As critics like Anderson have argued, even where your 
driving data does reflect entirely free choices, you may not deserve higher 
premiums if those choices serve some laudable social purpose — perhaps, 
you are driving through those locations at those times in order to distribute 
aid to homeless people.
These particular cases raise separate questions about who should bear the 
burden of equalising unfair outcomes. How much should the insurer be re-
quired to make their system ‘fair’ when there are likely to be genuine under-
lying differences in the frequency and number of pay-outs between different 
driver profiles? Is it the role of the state to provide compensation tax breaks 
or other benefits to drivers who live or do socially beneficial work in impov-
erished areas? Whichever way we go about answering these questions, it 
seems clear that we will be faced with more of them in future. As IoT devices 
become more widely embedded in all parts of our daily life, the data they 
generate will enable new kinds of prediction, classification and risk-assess-
ment. These forms of analysis are already being fed into systems whose en-
tire purpose is to detect differences between people and react accordingly. 
If we want an internet-of-fair-things, we need to adapt our philosophies of 
fairness in order to determine how differences between people justify differ-




The Philosophy of Technology uses philosophical thinking to try to under-
stand the social impact of technology. Originally, the philosophy of technol-
ogy focused on technology as a single grand concept, but in the late 20th 
Century with the industrial revolution and the emergence of many different 
technologies, philosophers realised that specific technologies were quite 
different from each other, and that, maybe, their philosophies should be 
too. By considering individual technologies — things like telephones, cars, 
planes, and computers — and combining philosophical thinking with the so-
cial sciences, the philosophy of technology helps us understand the intricate 
nature of our relationships with things.15  Here, we will use theories from the 
philosophy of technology to ask whether we can own the IoT; by asking this 





15 Brey, P. 2010. “Philosophy of technology after the empirical turn.”  Techné: Research in 
philosophy and technology 14 (1):36-48. http://doi.org/10.5840/techne20101416
The Philosophy of Te hnology uses philosophical thinking to try to under-
stand the social impact f technology. Origi ally, th  philosophy of technol-
ogy focused on technology as a single grand concept, but in the late 20th
Century with the industrial revo ution and th  emergence f many different
technologies, philosop rs realised hat specific t chnol gies were quite dif-
ferent from each other, and that, maybe, their philo ophies should be too. 
By considering individual techn logies, like tele ones, cars, planes, and 
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the phil s phy of technology elps u  understand the intricat  nature of our
relations ips with things.15  Here, we will use the ries from the philosop y
of tech ology to ask wh ther we can own the IoT; by asking this qu stion,
the battle between notions of Acceptability and Adoption become evident.
Ownership is an ancient concept, shared across many languages and cul-
tures. Over the centuries the concept has been used, subtle differences in its 
meaning have developed, but in the law, the term ownability refers to the at-
tribute of things that can be “ownable in law”.16 For example, things like cars, 
cats and crumpets can all be owned in law. However, people, the dwarf-plan-
et Pluto and philosophy cannot be owned, because they cannot be owned in 
law (although, until slavery was made illegal, some people could be owned 
in law). From this, we can see that physical things like objects, land, and 
livestock can be owned, while more broadly speaking people and concepts 
cannot be owned.17  With this in mind, you might have thought that the things 
that make up the IoT should be ownable. However, theories from the philos-
ophy of technology show us that ownability in the IoT is less straightforward. 
One way to get to the heart of what is important about ownership is to 
ask whom is a technology for. If I own an IoT smart speaker device (like 
an Amazon Echo), is it for me (the homeowner), is it for houseguests who 
stay in my home and use it while there, is it for the company who manufac-
tured it, or could it be for someone else entirely? To explore whom an IoT 
device might be for, we use a notion called the benefit attribute. The benefit 
attribute identifies the person or people whom a piece of technology is for 
with who might benefit from its use. However, even this doesn’t completely 
explain who a technology is for, because people benefit in different ways. 
Two concepts that help us to understand these differences are acceptability 
and adoption. 
Accounting for acceptability means trying to establish a kind of moral stand-
ard: if something is good and desirable, then it is acceptable.18 Establishing 
whether something is good and desirable is itself not a simple task with a 
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single answer; for example we might say ‘this is a good hammer’ (an instru-
mental judgement), but equally might say ‘this is a good person’ (a moral 
judgement). The same sorts of distinction can apply to the IoT. If we go back 
to the example of the IoT smart speaker, whether it is a good smart speaker 
(instrumentally) is different from whether it is good for me, my houseguests, 
or the company that made it (morally). Although it is important to acknowl-
edge the underlying complexity of the idea of acceptability, usually it is 
referred to in terms of the ethics that inform the moral judgements. 
When addressing the instrumental goodness of something, the notion of 
adoption19 becomes a more useful lens to look through. Adoption deals 
with enumeration, how something is in terms of quantity terms. In contrast, 
and as we have discussed previously, acceptability deals with ethics and 
morals, it  explores how technology ought to be and focusses on its qual-
ities. There are many models and approaches to understanding adoption 
(Technology Adoption Model, Value-based Adoption Model, Unified The-
ory of Acceptance and Use of Technology), but in contrast to studies of 
acceptability, they are all descriptive and do not address questions of moral 
goodness. So, while studying adoption may suggest that a technology is 
for somebody, because it describes that they do use it, it doesn’t explain 
whether their use of it is good for them (or others) or if that use is desirable.
If we go back to the idea of the benefit attribute, then the notions of adop-
tion and acceptability have profoundly different types of benefit attribute 
attached to them. With the smart speaker example the benefit attribute, 
when seen through the lens of adoption, may relate to how beneficial the 
widespread adoption of the smart speaker is for its manufacturer,20 irrespec-
tive of whether it benefits or harms consumers or wider society. In contrast, 
the benefit attribute for the homeowner and houseguests is better looked at 
in terms of acceptability; does the smart speaker do its job well and might 
it have any negative effects? Some recent evidence-based investigations 
into the IoT are biased towards the commercially-driven notion of adoption, 
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de Poel 2016: 180).
20 In a real-world example of this it benefits Amazon if more people own Echo devices because 
then their voice-recognition algorithms work better, which provides a better services, and may in 
turn help them sell more devices.
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discussing the need “to reach commercialisation”,21 to exploit “potentially 
huge market values”22 and for “promoting economic development”23 and 
this suggests there is a lack of research into the IoT which is concerned with 
morally-driven benefit attributes or acceptability.  
An acceptability-focused example did, however, appear in an episode of 
the television series Detectorists.24 When buying a new home on a tight 
budget the characters Andy and Rachael are shown round a rather dingy 
property. The slimy estate agent explains that the house has a voice recog-
nition system (somewhat similar to Amazon Echo) installed, and proceeds 
to demonstrate why this is a unique selling point. After three failed attempts 
to turn on the lights with this system (failed because the system doesn’t work 
very well) he declares “you can use voice recognition with that, so only you 
can turn the light on”. Perplexed, Rachael asks “why would you do that?”. 
With ever-decreasing confidence and a self-questioning tone, the agent re-
plies “so that…. burglars… have to….. bring their own torches?” The reality 
depicted in this scene is one where IoT in the home is difficult to use, and 
even when it does work is often useless. This lack of utility combined with 
the IoT device’s association with the estate agent seems to echo and critique 
the widespread imbalance of benefit attributes toward those that align with 
selling more (adoption) and those that promote a morally good outcome 
(acceptability).
The IoT has inspired a move away from traditional ownership, and toward 
subscription-supported business models — a necessary move in order to en-
sure the viability of devices that require significant ongoing technical infra-
structure to work (e.g. cloud services). Despite this necessary shift, perhaps 
the most pertinent question now is not ‘is it possible to own IoT devices’, but 
‘who would want to own them’?  
21 Kim, Y., Park, Y. and Choi, J. 2017. “A study on the adoption of IoT smart home service: 
using Value-based Adoption Model.”  Total Quality Management & Business Excellence 28 
(9-10):1149-1165.
22 Hsu, C., and Lin, J. C. 2018. “Exploring Factors Affecting the Adoption of   Internet of 
Things Services.”  Journal of Computer Information Systems 58 (1):49-57.
23 Hsu, C, and C Yeh. 2017. “Understanding the factors affecting the adoption of the Internet 
of Things.”  Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 29 (9):1089-1102.
24 Channel X TV. 2017. Detectorists. BBC4. Series 3 (Ep. 3).
Accelerationism
The world has been getting faster for a long time. Tracing our recent history 
back to the roots of the industrial revolution, there are countless examples 
of how technological development has been continually, and with ever-in-
creasing rapidity, changing the way we live in and act upon the world. The 
disorientating effects of this constant change have provoked many social 
and political responses, but if we were to categorise them, we might sepa-
rate them into those which seek to slow its pace and those which embrace 
the opportunities that technology offers. In the 19th century the Luddites 
destroyed steam-powered factory machinery, because, as they saw it, the 
machines were destroying people’s jobs. However, by the 20th century the 
former British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, argued that to be successful 
Britain must embrace the “White Heat” of technology.25
The problem is that both responses have merit. Technological change often 
means that people’s lives are disrupted. Technology is frequently used to 
realise financial efficiencies and given that in many situations the most sig-
nificant financial expense is human resources, technology often disrupts 
jobs, work, and earnings, by de-skilling craftsmen, and making workers re-
dundant. At the same time, the impact of technology has been enormously 
positive. Healthcare, communication technologies, transportation technol-
ogy, and manufacturing techniques have drastically increased life expec-
tancy and quality of life across vast swathes of the planet. Accelerationism 
is the view that holding back technologically-powered change is neither 
possible nor desirable (the Luddites failed to stop the spread of automat-
ed factories after all, and a good thing too!). If this is true, then the best 
way forward is to grasp the productive power of technology and to make 
sure it is used to make people’s lives better and to not do harm to others. 
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l ti i
The founding text of accelerationist thought is arguably The Communist 
Manifesto. In one of its most famous passages, Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels describe capitalism as follows:
Marx and Engels were writing at the height of the Industrial Revolution. 
The productive capabilities unlocked by automation were drawing more 
and more people away from the countryside and into factories. In the 
process, the old structures of life, work and family that structured the then 
primarily agricultural economy were being replaced by new ones of work-
ers and employers living in the rapidly-growing cities. This wave of diso-
rienting change generated much wealth, but it also created widespread 
misery and suffering among the poor. This prompted Marx and Engels to 
imagine their communist alternative around this simple question: could we 
have the wealth without the misery? 
We don’t have to be communists to accept that this description captures 
something of what it feels like to live in a society which is being rapid-
ly changed by technology. As societies, we’re still coming to terms with 
the impact that the Internet is having on every aspect of our lives. The 
vocabulary of the early Internet — home pages, email addresses, hy-
perlinks, forums — reflects the fact that it was designed as a commons; 
an open place, for the people. However, the Internet has restructured 
our lives in very uncommon ways. These were hard to anticipate in 
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Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance 
of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distin-
guish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen 
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossi-fy. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his 
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
Marx and Engels (1848)26
Marx and Engels were writing at the height of the Industrial Revolution. 
The productive capabilities unlocked by automation were drawing more 
and more people away from the countryside and into factories. In the 
process, the old structures of life, work and family that structured the then 
primarily agricultural economy were being replaced by new ones of work-
ers and employers living in the rapidly-growing cities. This wave of diso-
rienting change generated much wealth, but it also created widespread 
misery and suffering among the poor. This prompted Marx and Engels to 
imagine their communist alternative around this simple question: could we 
have the wealth without the misery? 
We don’t have to be communists to accept that this description captures 
something of what it feels like to live in a society which is being rapid-
ly changed by technology. As societies, we’re still coming to terms with 
the impact that the Internet is having on every aspect of our lives. The 
vocabulary of the early Internet — home pages, email addresses, hy-
perlinks, forums — reflects the fact that it was designed as a commons; 
an open place, for the people. However, the Internet has restructured 
our lives in very uncommon ways. These were hard to anticipate in
the 1990s, and have taken a form which is unsettling and disruptive 
in just the ways that Marx and Engels realised the Industrial Revolu-
tion was unsettling and disruptive, as represented in the quote above.
The disruptions we are living through have an impact on many aspects of 
our lives. Many people now work within new economies which use plat-
forms like Uber or Deliveroo; although these companies and their technol-
ogy-enabled business models offer unique propositions to customers, the 
more we use them the more they restructure and sometimes destroy others. 
The apparently innocent act of sharing our lives with friends via social 
platforms often invades our privacy in ways we don’t understand, and in 
making us ‘the product’ drives multi-billion-dollar advertising businesses. 
Before the internet, notions of privacy, work and home, even inside and 
outside, were straightforward. If I was inside my house, I was not at work. 
If I was reading a book in my home, I would have a reasonable expecta-
tion that no-one else would know what that book was, when I was reading 
it, or what other books I might own. Today, if I can work just as effectively 
in the office or on the train, or at home, then where does work end and 
home begin? If my internet service provider can know what websites I’ve 
been visiting, Spotify know what music I’ve been listening to, or Netflix 
know what my favourite shows are, in what sense are my entertainment 
choices private? And how might these companies use this information in 
ways which I might not expect? What say might I have in this now, and 
what effect might my decisions have in the future? 
The fact is, we are at the thin end of the IoT wedge. Although the IoT 
is here, it is going to be far more pervasive in the future. The changes 
brought about by the IoT will continue to accelerate.  
Automation, artificial intelligence, and networked infrastructures offer 
huge opportunities for increasing efficiencies across many industries, and 
for making our cities and homes safer, more ecologically sound, and more 
pleasurable to live in. Self-driving cars are but one way that vast amounts 
of ‘boring and demeaning’ work can be ‘permanently eliminated’.27
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However, the acceleration is so powerful that we seem to be in danger of 
falling over a precipice of the future. Beyond the edge, there will either be 
Star Trek or The Matrix28: either we will live in a world in which automation 
has freed up people and resources so that everyone enjoys its benefits, or 
one in which the majority live increasingly miserable lives as automation 
removes their means of making money and having a meaningful vocation. 
In the face of this, it can be tempting to want to slam on the brakes: to slow 
the pace of technological change so that we can catch up with ourselves, 
but as the Luddites learned, this is nigh-on impossible. The challenge of 
accelerationist thinking, then, is to ride the tiger. We must look at the 
technological changes that can at times seem about to overwhelm us, and 
rather than despairing, we must embrace the great potential benefits they 
offer while remaining vigilant in guarding against their potential harm. 
Because these benefits and harms are often subtle and unexpected, we 
must embrace new ways of evaluating and regulating new technologies, 
particularly those that make up the IoT.
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Summary
The discussions in this book are not intended as overarching philosophies 
for the IoT, nor do they suggest that they are the ‘best’ ways of developing 
understandings of the IoT (for, as Socrates said ‘The only true wisdom is 
in knowing you know nothing’). What we are offering in the book is our 
own ideas about how philosophy might help us answer the questions the 
IoT poses us (because, as Aristotle argued ‘It is the mark of an educated 
mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it’). For interested 
readers, the footnotes throughout the book provide links to a wide range of 
resources, including several PETRAS research papers that build upon these 
ideas. Keeping in mind that Plato’s teaching, ‘A good decision is based on 
knowledge and not numbers’, probably applies to the IoT as much as it does 
anything else, we hope that these chapters have helped you to ‘know’ more 
about both the IoT and philosophy.
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